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Abstract: This paper analyzes the optimal strategies for an attacker and a defender in 8 
an attack-defense game on a network consisting of interdependent subnetworks. The 9 
defender moves first and allocates its resource to protect the network nodes. The 10 
attacker then moves and allocates its resources to attack the network nodes. The binary 11 
decision diagram is employed to obtain all potential states of the network system after 12 
attack. Considering each of its opponent’s strategies, the game player tries to maximize 13 
its own cumulative prospect value. The backward induction method is employed to 14 
obtain the game players’ optimal strategies, respectively. Different resource 15 
relationships are analyzed to testify the robustness of the main conclusions and players’ 16 
risk attitudes are also investigated. Numerical examples are used to illustrate the 17 
analysis. 18 
Keywords: attack-defense game; interdependent network; nodes; binary decision 19 
diagram; prospect value 20 
 21 
1. Introduction 22 
Reliability analysis of complex networks has gained popularity in the literature, 23 
which is especially the case in recent years. Existing research has analyzed the 24 
reliability of networks of different structures (Albert et al. 2000, Archibald et al. 2010, 25 
Levitin & Hausken, 2009, Chopra & Khanna, 2015). Most authors, however, restrict 26 
their assumptions to a single network such as an electrical network or a computer 27 
network. In practice, node failures in different networks may be interdependent. For 28 
example, Buldyrev et al. (2010) investigated the blackouts of a power gird, occurred in 29 
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Italy on 28 September 2003, which is composed of an electrical subnetwork and an 30 
Internet subnetwork. These two subnetworks function interdependently since the 31 
Internet subnetwork serves as communication nodes to control the actions of the 32 
electrical subnetwork and the electrical subnetwork supplies power to the Internet 33 
subnetwork. Some researches investigate maintenance policies of interdependent 34 
subnetworks, considering the unintentional impact such as natural aging (Mo et al. 35 
2015). Little research, however, has analyzed risk analysis of intelligent adversaries on 36 
interdependent networks, which motivates the research of this paper. 37 
This paper analyzes the attack-defense game with one attacker and one defender, 38 
where the defender defends the nodes in a network consisting of interdependent 39 
subnetworks and the attacker attacks these nodes, both players needing to allocate their 40 
resources. It represents the states of the network with the binary decision diagram (BDD) 41 
and assumes the survivability of each node depends on the protection/attack resources 42 
allocated by the players. The cumulative prospect theory (CPT), a model for descriptive 43 
decisions under risk and uncertainty (Tversky & Kehneman, 1992), is employed to 44 
obtain the players’ cumulative prospect value (CPV).  45 
Our work is relevant to three streams of literature: the attack-defense game, 46 
interdependent networks, and reliability modelling. The attack-defense game typically 47 
involves a strategic attacker who aims to destroy the defender’s targets. Levitin & 48 
Hausken (2010) analyzed the defense and attack strategies of systems considering 49 
different system structure detection probabilities by the attacker. Hausken & Bier (2011) 50 
studied the defending issue against multiple different attackers, which was further 51 
studied by Zhang & Ramirez-Marquez (2013), who consider incomplete information. 52 
Bier & Hausken (2013) conducted an attack-defense analysis to study intentional 53 
attacker’s impact on transportation systems. Zhai et al. (2016) studied the defense and 54 
attack strategies for a system with a common bus performance-sharing mechanism. Wu 55 
et al. (2018) considered an attack-defense game where the defender allocates its 56 
resource to preventive strike and false targets. Peng et al. (2018) considered both 57 
intentional and unintentional impact on a typical attack-defense game. Li et al. (2018) 58 
analyzed the attack-defense game from a network science perspective.  59 
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Research on the attack-defense game in a complex interdependent system is scarce. 60 
Hausken (2017a) proposed a framework to numerically analyze the strategic defense of 61 
a complex and dependent system with one strategic attacker. They assume that the 62 
defender minimizes the expected damage and costs while the attacker maximizes the 63 
difference between the cost due to the expected damage and the attack costs. Hausken 64 
(2017b) considered a similar problem of attack and defense strategies on two 65 
interdependent targets. Hausken (2019) theoretically showed the optimal defense and 66 
attack strategies, and discussed the impact of contest intensity, unit effort costs, and 67 
target values. Nonetheless, in reality, the game players’ strategies may depend not only 68 
on their expected losses but also on their risk attitudes. The present paper employs the 69 
players’ CPVs as their respective objective functions such that their risk preferences are 70 
considered. 71 
As for the interdependent network, Kunreuther & Heal (2003) constructed a 72 
framework of interdependent security. Later on, Hausken (2006) considered the security 73 
investment problem and substitution effects. Zhuang et al. (2007) further constructed a 74 
subsidy problem with discount rates in interdependent security. Nganje et al. (2008) 75 
extended the interdependent security model through a case-study on a real-world 76 
example of a milk supply chain. Hardy et al. (2007) and Xing (2007) studied the 77 
reliability of networks with multiple terminals using the BDD technique. Zio & 78 
Sansavini (2011) modeled interdependent network systems to identify cascade-safe 79 
operating margins. Li & Sansavini (2013) investigated the multi-objective optimization 80 
of cascading failure protection in complex networks. Johansson & Hassel (2010) 81 
proposed an approach to modelling interdependent infrastructures in the context of 82 
vulnerability analysis. Wu et al. (2016) modeled cascading failures in interdependent 83 
infrastructures under terrorist attacks. Mackenzie et al. (2016) analyzed the static and 84 
dynamic resource allocation models for recovery of interdependent systems with a case 85 
study on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill to illustrate it. Peng (2018) studied the 86 
reliability of a network consisting of interdependent subnetworks, with the focus on the 87 
internal failure of the nodes, rather than on the impacts from the strategic attackers. 88 
Traditionally, the Tullock model is widely employed in the reliability modelling in 89 
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the attack-defense game and has been adapted to different scenarios by many 90 
researchers (see Tullock, 2001; Hausken & Zhuang, 2011, for example). Nonetheless, 91 
the Tullock model cannot properly depict players’ risk attitudes in the game. To fill in 92 
this gap, Liu et al. (2014) proposed a risk-decision analysis method based on the 93 
cumulative prospect theory to predict defender’s emergency response confronting with 94 
unintentional impact, say that, natural disasters.  95 
This paper uses the BDD to represent the different combinations of destructed 96 
nodes, where each node has binary states being “destructed” and “not destructed”. The 97 
state of a system is assumed to depend on not only the system structure but also the 98 
players’ strategies and their risk attitudes. 99 
The novelty and main contributions of this paper are summarized in the following: 100 
 The novelty is: We utilize cumulative prospect theory to investigate the attack-101 
defense strategy of a network composed of interdependent subnetworks. 102 
 The main contributions include: (1) Different resource relationships and different 103 
cost relationships are considered, respectively, in seeking the optimal attack and 104 
defense strategies, and (2) Cumulative prospect theory is combined with the 105 
traditional Tullock model to obtain the players’ CPVs, which can better depict the 106 
players’ risk preferences and reflect their risk attitudes than merely considering their 107 
expected system losses. 108 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model 109 
setup. Sections 3 analyzes the optimal attack strategies for the attacker. Section 4 110 
employs the backward induction method to solve the optimal defense strategies for the 111 
defender. Section 5 analyzes the impact of risk preferences. Section 6 discusses the case 112 
for complex system with amounts of nodes. Section 7 concludes the paper and proposes 113 
future research suggestions. 114 
 115 
2. Model Foundation 116 
Consider a network composed of a power subnetwork and a control subnetwork. 117 
The nodes in the control subnetwork require power supply from the power subnetwork 118 
whilst the nodes in the power subnetwork are controlled by the nodes in the control 119 
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subnetwork. Suppose that an intelligent adversary, or the attacker, intends to attack the 120 
nodes in the network and the owner of the network is regarded the defender who 121 
protects the network from damage. Both players need resources for their actions.  122 
Assume that the defender allocates an amount, 𝑟 , of its limited resource to 123 
protecting the nodes in the network and the attacker spends an amount, 𝑅, of its limited 124 
resource on attacking the nodes. Due to the interdependence, the failure of a node in 125 
one subnetwork may cause some nodes in other subnetwork to fail. Once a node fails, 126 
no matter whether the destruction is due to the attacker or the failure propagation from 127 
other nodes, the node and its connections with other nodes will be removed from the 128 
network it belongs to. After the removal, if the number of the connected nodes in a 129 
cluster in a subnetwork is smaller than a pre-specified number, the cluster will fail. In 130 
particular, we consider the case where a node fails if it stands alone from any other 131 
nodes within a subnetwork, that is, any single node cannot survive but any cluster with 132 
no smaller than 2 nodes can survive. Since the failure of a node in one subnetwork may 133 
cause several nodes in the other subnetwork to fail, more nodes in the first subnetwork 134 
may fail. Such cascading failures may have a catastrophic effect on the network.  135 
Notations 
,R r  Resource for the attacker and the defender, respectively 
, , [1,6]j jA B j  Nodes of the two subnetworks of the network, respectively 
, , { , }, [1,6]ij ijr R i A B j   Resource allocation on different nodes, respectively 
,c C  Unit cost for protection and attack effort, respectively 
ijm  Contest intensity parameters 
ijp  Survivability of each node of the network, respectively 
,dk aku u  
Utility for the defender and the attacker, respectively 
kp  
Probability of the different outcomes, respectively 
,a dV V  CPVs of the attacker and the defender, respectively 
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( )lkv u  Value of the potential outcome 
,k k 
 
 Decision weight for the value of the potential gain and loss, 
respectively 
, ,g l   Risk parameters 
,w w   Weighting functions for gains and losses, respectively 
,   Weighting function parameters 
Consider an illustrative network that has been analyzed by several researchers 136 
(Buldyrev et al. 2010; Peng 2018), as shown in Figure 1 (a). There are two 137 
interdependent subnetworks A and B, each of which consists of six nodes, denoted by 138 
, {1,2,3,4,5,6}jA j  and , {1,2,3,4,5,6}jB j , respectively, and the connections of 139 
these nodes are shown with arcs. Besides, the failure of jA  always causes jB  to fail, 140 
and vice versa. Suppose that subnetwork A is the power subnetwork in which each 141 
electricity station jA  is controlled by jB , which is powered by jA . Therefore, either 142 
the failure of jA  or that of jB  causes the other one to fail. 143 
Suppose that A5 fails, then B5, which is connected with A5, will fail. The failures 144 
of A5 and B5 will then cause their connections with other nodes to be removed. After 145 
the removals, the network will become the one shown in Figure 1 (b), where both A4 146 
and A6 then become isolated. Thus, A4 and A6 will fail and then cause B4 and B6 to fail 147 
as well. B3 is then isolated and thus causes A3 to fail. Finally, the network will 148 
degenerate to the one shown in Figure 1 (c). 149 
 150 
Figure 1 An Illustrative Network Consisting of Interdependent Networks  151 
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As for the defender, as assumed, it spends the amount, r  , of its resources on 152 
protecting the twelve nodes. We further denote that the defender will spend the amount, 153 
𝑟𝑖𝑗 of its resources on protecting each node in the network and the attack will spend the 154 








  , and 
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    156 
Employing the traditional Tullock model, we can obtain the survivability of each 157 
node of the subnetworks 158 
( / )
, { , }, {1,2,3,4,5,6}.








p i A B j
r c R C
  

        (1) 159 
Among, ( / )ijr c  represents the contest effort (resource spent on the node divided 160 
by the unit cost) that the defender takes by spending the resource on defending the ij -161 
th node, and ( / )ijR C  denotes the contest effort of the attacker on the ij  -th node. 162 
Additionally, ijm  is the contest intensity on the ij -th node where low intensity occurs 163 
if neither players get a significant advantage and vice versa. 164 
To formulate the utility of both players, we should note that each node in the 165 
subnetworks can either be destroyed or survive, which ultimately forms many different 166 
cases for the final state of the network. The probability for each case can be calculated 167 
and the CPVs for both players can be obtained for all the cases, for which we employ 168 
the BDD. Typically, a BDD is a directed acyclic graph in which all paths start at the 169 
root vertex and terminate in one of two states, either representing a system failure or a 170 
system success. A BDD is composed of terminal and non-terminal vertices, which are 171 
connected by branches, where the non-terminal vertices correspond to all the potential 172 
events of the fault tree (Bartlett & Andrews, 2001; Peng et al. 2016). 173 
Take the network in Figure 1 for illustration, the BDD is as constructed as in Figure 174 
2. Note that the left branch of each BDD node represents that both network nodes in the 175 
BDD node are undestroyed by the attacker and the right branch represents that at least 176 
one network node in the BDD node is destroyed by the attacker. The terminal BDD 177 
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constructed for each branch contains all failed network nodes no matter whether the 178 




Figure 2. The Binary Decision Diagram for Figure 1
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Starting from the nodes {A1, B1}, and then iteratively considering {A2, B2}, …, {A6, 200 
B6}, we represent all the possible final states of the network. Take the first two layers 201 
as an example. The binary decision diagram starts from the first concerned nodes {A1, 202 
B1}. On the left branch, both nodes survive and then we should consider the possible 203 
cases for {A2, B2}. However, on the right branch, since at least one of the nodes in {A1, 204 
B1} fails, leading to the failure of {A2, B2}, then we should not add the BDD node {A2, 205 
B2} but consider {A3, B3} as the next possible nodes to fail after the failure of A1, B1, 206 
A2, B2. Continuing in this way until all the nodes are considered, Figure 2 can be 207 
obtained. It can be seen that there are thirteen different possible final states for the 208 
network. We specifically illustrate the thirteen cases and their corresponding failed 209 
nodes as below. 210 
 Case 1: No failure.  211 
 Case 2: A1 or B1 fails, leading to the failure of A1, A2, B1, and B2, then no other node 212 
fails. 213 
 Case 3: A1 or B1 fails and A3 or B3 fails, leading to the failure of A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, 214 
and B3, then no other node fails.  215 
 Case 4: A1 or B1 fails, A3 or B3 fails, and A4 or B4 fails, leading to the failure of A1, 216 
A2, A3, A4, B1, B2, B3, and B4, then no other node fails.  217 
 Case 5: A1 or B1 fails, A3 or B3 fails, and A6 or B6 fails, leading to the failure of A1, 218 
A2, A3, A6, B1, B2, B3, and B6, then no other node fails.  219 
 Case 6: A1 or B1 fails and A6 or B6 fails, leading to the failure of A1, A2, A6, B1, B2, 220 
and B6, then no other node fails. 221 
 Case 7: A2 or B2 fails, leading to the failure of A2 and B2, then no other node fails. 222 
 Case 8: A3 or B3 fails, leading to the failure of A3 and B3, then no other node fails.  223 
 Case 9: A3 or B3 fails and A4 or B4 fails, leading to the failure of A3, A4, B3, and B4, 224 
then no other node fails. 225 
 Case 10: A3 or B3 fails, A4 or B4 fails, A5 or B5, and A6 or B6 fails, leading to the 226 
failure of A3, A4, A5, A6, B3, B4, B5, and B6, then no other node fails.  227 
 Case 11: A3 or B3 fails and A6 or B6 fails, leading to the failure of A3, A6, B3, and B6, 228 
then no other node fails.  229 
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 Case 12: A6 or B6 fails, leading to the failure of A6 and B6, then no other node fails.  230 
 Case 13: Network destruction. More than four nodes in each network are destroyed. 231 
For each case, we denote , {1,2,...,12,13}dku k  and , {1,2,...,12,13}aku k  as 232 
the utility of the defender and the attacker and , {1,2,...,12,13}kp k  as the probability 233 
of the occurrence of each case, respectively. The destruction of each pair of nodes in 234 
the networks is assumed to deal 5 units of utility damage to the defender. The survival 235 
of each pair of nodes is assumed to cause 10 units of utility bonus while the network is 236 
still operating since the defender cares more about the safety of the network. Similarly, 237 
each pair destruction will let the attacker gain 10 units of utility and the survival of each 238 
pair will deal 5 units of utility when the network is not under destruction. Specifically, 239 
if the network is destroyed by the attacker, the attacker will obtain 60 units of utility 240 
and the defender will obtain -30 units of utility. We perform the value under each case 241 
in Table 1. 242 
Table 1 Players’ utility under Different Cases 243 
Number of failed pairs of nodes 
dku  aku  Case 
0 60 -30 1 
1 45 -15 7,8,12 
2 30 0 2,9,11 
3 15 15 3,6 
4 0 30 4,5,10 
(5)6 -30 60 13 
The probability of each outcome can be calculated through basic permutation and 244 












(1 ) ,A B Aj Bj
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                            (14) 259 
To obtain the players’ CPV, we introduce the concept of weighting functions 𝑤+ 260 
and 𝑤− for gains and losses as below. 261 
1/
( ) ,




















                    (16) 264 
where both    and    are weighting parameters, which are usually determined 265 
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through the experiments. The decision weights can therefore be represented by  266 
1
( ) ( ),
n n
k j j
j k j k
w p w p   
  












                         (18) 269 
respectively. 270 
The value of the potential outcome can be denoted by  271 
0,












               (19) 272 
where both g  and l  are the exponent parameters (risk-seeking and risk-averse) and 273 
  is the sensitivity parameter, which measures the sensitivity to losses than gains. 274 




= ( ) ( ) ,d dk k d k
k
V v u v u  

                      (20) 276 
and 277 
2,3,4,5,6,9,10,11,13 1,7,8,12
= ( ) ( ) .a ak k ak k
k k
V v u v u  
 
                (21) 278 
respectively. 279 
In this paper, it is assumed that the defender allocates the resource evenly into the 280 
network nodes, thus the defender’s CPV depends only on the attacker’s strategy. On the 281 
other hand, the attacker knows the defender’s allocation and chooses its resource 282 
allocation to maximize its own CPV as represented by Eq. (8). Thus, the attacker has 283 
*( ) ( ( )), { , }, {1,2,3,4,5,6}ij a ijR ArgMax V r i A B j   . As for the defender, there should 284 
be 
* *( ) ( ( )), { , }, {1,2,3,4,5,6}ij d ijr ArgMax V R i A B j   . 285 
 286 
3. Optimal Attack Strategies 287 
Without loss of generality, we first assume that the resources of both players are 288 
the same, 12r R   , for instance, and will relax this assumption in the extension. 289 
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Further, in the benchmark, we assume that both the unit cost of protection and the unit 290 
cost of attack equal to one, i.e., 1c C  . Moreover, we set the risk parameters as 291 
0.85, 0.85, 4.10, 0.60g l       and 0.70  , and conduct sensitivity analysis to 292 
study the influence of risk preferences. First, we calculate the situation where both the 293 
attacker and the defender evenly spend their resources on each node and the results go 294 
to 51dV    and 24.1aV  . Later, the backward induction is employed to obtain the 295 
optimal attack and defense strategies. For a given defense strategies combination 296 
1 1 6 6( , ) ( , ,..., , )Aj Bj A B A Br r r r r r  , the attacker will choose the optimal attack strategies 297 
combination 
1 1 6 6( , ) ( , ,..., , )Aj Bj A B A BR R R R R R   to maximize its CPV, say that, 298 
* *( , ) argmax( ( , ))Aj Bj a Aj BjR R V r r . 299 
In this section, we assume that the defender will evenly allocate all its resource 300 
into all nodes in the interdependent networks, that is, 1ijr   . For simplicity, it is 301 
assumed that the resource allocation on each node must be integer. Thus, the optimal 302 
attack strategy combination can be obtained, as performed in Table 2. Note that the 303 
entries without any number equal to zero by default. 304 








5BR  aV  dV  
3 3 3 3 32.13 -73.5 
In Table 2, variables such as 
*, { , }, 1,2,3,6ijR i A B j    are not assigned any 306 
values, and similarly hereinafter. It is interesting to point out that in Table 2, the optimal 307 
attack strategies require the attacker to spend all resource into A4, B4, A5, and B5, 308 
respectively. In fact, when the defender evenly distributes the resource into all nodes, 309 
the optimal strategies for the attacker is to allocate all resource evenly into four nodes: 310 
A4, B4 A5, and B5 and the corresponding CPV for both players will go to 73.5dV    311 
and 32.13aV  . Since the failure of A5 and B5 will finally lead to the failure of A3-A6 312 
and B3-B6, the network will be destructed, as shown in Figure 1. Moreover, the failures 313 
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of A4 and B4 will lead to the failure of A4 and B4, which divides the original network 314 
into two parts with each part combining two interdependent pairs of nodes. Any further 315 
node failure will result in the destruction of the network, which makes the whole 316 
network more vulnerable than before. 317 
 318 
4. Optimal Defense Strategies 319 
For the defender who moves first, the optimal defense strategies go to the case 320 
where the CPV of the defender is maximized. Since the attacker can observe the action 321 
of the defender, it will always take the strategy that benefits itself most. Thus, the 322 
defender should compare the CPVs under all possible combinations of defense 323 
strategies and choose the largest one among them. That is, 324 
* * * *( , ) argmax( ( , ))Aj Bj d Aj Bjr r V R R .  325 
Solving the optimal defender strategy needs a two-fold optimization scheme where 326 
the optimal attack strategy needs to be solved for any fixed defense strategy, based on 327 
which the optimal defense strategy should be solved. It would be time consuming to 328 
use enumeration to solve the two-fold optimization, thus we employ an improved 329 
algorithm to simplify the calculation of the optimal defense strategy. 330 
Two methods are applied to decrease the complexity of the problem: memory 331 
search and spiritually pruning (Polyn et al. 2005; Ng et al. 1998). From the system 332 
structure, it can be seen that the CPV of both players remain the same if the defender 333 
and the attacker simultaneously swap the resource spent on a node in subnetwork A and 334 
the corresponding node in subnetwork B. Therefore, without loss of generality, we 335 
assume that the resource the defender spends into the network of A will always be less 336 
than or equal to those spent into B, for instance, Aj Bjr r . Moreover, it is easy to notice 337 
that: if the defender spends no resource on one node, the attacker will never spend more 338 
than 1 unit of its resource into attacking the node. This is because 1 attack resource is 339 
enough to destroy an unprotected node. We can therefore use spiritually pruning to 340 
eliminate the irrational cases. 341 
Hence, the optimal defense strategy, the responsive attack strategy and their 342 
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corresponding CPVs are performed in Table 3. 343 


















6Br  dV  


















6BR  aV  
  4 1  1  5 1 30.15 
In Table 3, variables such as 
* , 1,3,6Ajr j   and 
* , 1,3,6AjR j   are not assigned 345 
any values. We now obtain the optimal defense and attack strategies under the 346 
benchmark. The defender moves first and allocates 2 units of resource into each node 347 
of A2, B2, A4, B4 and A5, B5. The attacker, having observed the defender’s action, will 348 
now choose to spare 4 units of resource for A5, 5 units of resource into B5, and 1 unit of 349 
resource into each of the nodes of B1, B3, and B6. The CPV of the defender under this 350 
case is higher than the case in Table 2 where the defender evenly distributes the resource 351 
and the CPV of the attacker decreases. The results here again prove the significance of 352 
the node A4, B4 and A5, B5. 353 
There are two additional cases that deserve mentioning: the attacker moves first, 354 
and both players move simultaneously. For the former scenario, the attacker and the 355 
defender in backward induction should be exchanged, as well as their decision variables. 356 
The defender first chooses the optimal strategy to maximize its CPV, i.e., 357 
* *( , ) argmax( ( , ))Aj Bj d Aj Bjr r V R R . The attacker then compares all possible outcomes and 358 
chooses the dominating strategy, i.e., * * * *( , ) argmax( ( , ))Aj Bj a Aj BjR R V r r . The specific 359 
calculating approach is exactly the same as the case where the defender moves first. As 360 
for the latter scenario, there will be no need for the application of backward induction. 361 
For each player, it independently chooses its strategy through maximizing its CPV. In 362 
general, one can obtain the optimal attack and defense strategies through repetitively 363 
going through Section 3, introducing the attacker’s and the defender’s decision 364 
variables, respectively. The reader is referred to Hausken et al. (2009) and Hausken 365 




5. Impact of Risk Preferences 368 
For the sake of distinguishing our proposed CPT model from the traditional 369 
Tullock model, we concentrate on the analysis of risk preferences in this section. We 370 
also conduct sensitivity analysis on the resource held by the defender and the attacker 371 
as well as the unit cost of each player. To facilitate the exposition, the expressions, 372 
proofs, and relevant figures are given in the online appendix.  373 
The comparative analysis on resource shows that: if the defender owns more 374 
resource than the attacker and evenly distributes it into all nodes, then the optimal attack 375 
strategy is to centralize fire, say that, attack the most vulnerable nodes. In contrast, 376 
when the attacker owns more resource than the defender, then the optimal strategy for 377 
the attacker is to spend all resource into four vulnerable nodes: A4, B4 and A5, B5. In 378 
addition, if the defender evenly distributes resource into all nodes, then the summation 379 
of both players’ CPV only depends on the risk parameter. Results on the analysis of 380 
resource vary from the traditional wisdom proposed in previous literature. The 381 
traditional Tullock model, used by many researchers, i.e., Wu et al. (2018), showed that 382 
the reliability of the defender, will be severely damaged if the counterpart owns resource 383 
advantage. The CPT model, through taking the risk attitude into account, demonstrated 384 
the existence of another equilibrium. The advantageous player in our proposed model 385 
will allocate the majority of its resource to the most vulnerable nodes within the 386 
subnetwork and the passive player will allocate the majority of its resource to defending 387 
these nodes, leading to a higher summation of CPV than the benchmark. In other words, 388 
when players are risk-sensitive, their strategies will change and the second mover 389 
benefits more. The players can therefore assess the risk parameters for the counterpart 390 
from the historical data, precisely deduce the action that is going to take, and then 391 
respond in a more efficient way. 392 
We continue our analysis through concentrating on two different risk behaviors: 393 
risk-seeking or risk-averse. When 0 1g  , the value function exhibits risk aversion 394 
over gains and when 0 1l  , the function favors risk seeking over risk losses. In fact, 395 
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the CPV is influenced by the risk preferences, which makes the changes on the 396 
attacker’s risk parameters may not only alter the attacker’s CPV but also 397 
correspondingly change the optimal attack strategies. As the defender should anticipate 398 
the optimal attack strategy when choosing its defense strategies, the optimal defense 399 
strategies will change accordingly. Therefore, to analyze the influence of risk 400 
preferences on the attack-defense game, we now alter the parameters of ,g l  and  , 401 
respectively, to analyze the behavior of each party under the case where the players 402 
become more risk-averse, risk seeking or more sensitive to losses than gains.  403 
In the online Appendix 1, we prove the optimality of optimal attack strategies and 404 
the invariance of the summation of CPV of both players. Therefore, we directly show 405 
that the optimal attack strategies when the defender evenly allocate the resource are 406 
4 3ir    and 5 3ir   . The CPV of each player are presented in Figure 3 and the 407 
summation of CPVs under the alteration of g  and l  are performed in Figure 4. 408 
 409 
Figure 3 CPVs of Both Players under Different Risk Preferences 410 
Observation 1. The CPV of the attacker depends the majority on g  while the 411 
CPV of the defender depends the majority on l . When the attacker becomes more risk-412 
averse than its attitude in benchmark, its CPV increases. When the attacker becomes 413 
more risk-seeking, its CPV slowly decreases. Additionally, the summation of the CPV 414 
decreases with the increase of l  and increases with the increase of g . 415 
It is easy to understand the relationship between CPV and the risk parameters from 416 
the equations. We can therefore conclude that: when the defender evenly distributes the 417 
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resource into all nodes, the attacker should choose the most conservative method in 418 
order to maximize the CPV. Note that we do not discuss the influence of risk preferences 419 
on the CPV of the defender here since we have already fixed the defending strategy. 420 
From the blue plane shown in Figure 3, when both players become more risk-averse, 421 
then the CPV of defender increases faster than the decrease of the CPV of the attacker. 422 
In reality, when the attacker cares more about the risk, then the strategy will become 423 
more conservative than before and thus increase the social welfare. Interestingly, we 424 
find that the attacker has the incentive to become risk-averse, which may finally 425 
increase the social welfare. This is counterintuitive since the reliability model applied 426 
in previous literature demonstrates that the attacker’s radical strategies will lead to a 427 
lose-lose situation. In contrast, for the interdependent network, the design of attacking 428 
strategy is more challenging than the normal system without interdependency since the 429 
resource should be divided. In effect, a more risk-averse attacker and its conservative 430 
strategy increases the summation of CPV. 431 
Now we perform the results under the alteration of   in Figure 4. 432 
  433 
Figure 4 CPVs under the Alteration of   434 
Observation 2. If the players become more sensitive to losses than gains, the 435 
attacker’s CPV will decrease indistinctively. However, the defender’s CPV will greatly 436 
decrease, thus lower down the summation of CPVs.  437 
Observation 2 is easy to understand based on Eqs. (20) and (21). In reality, if the 438 
players care more about its losses, then the strategy will alter to a conservative way, 439 
which reaches the same effort as shifting g . 440 
Interestingly, we find the same optimal attack and defense strategy as shown in 441 
Table 3 under the alteration of the risk preferences, for instance, no matter whether both 442 
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players become more risk-averse or risk-seeking, the optimal strategy for both players 443 
remain the same. Therefore, we now directly perform the CPV for both players when 444 
the defender is dynamic allocating its resource in Figure 5. 445 
 446 
Figure 5 CPVs of Both Players under Different Risk Preferences 447 
Observation 3. The defender’s CPV only depends on the risk preference of l  448 
and the attacker’s CPV only depends on the risk preference of g . Additionally, the 449 
summation of the CPV decreases with the increase of l  and increases with the increase 450 
of g . 451 
Since the attacker will always choose the strategy to maximize its CPV after 452 
observing the action of the defender, then for the attacker, cases 1, 7, 8, or 12 will never 453 
occur. Therefore, the terms conclude parameter l  in the expression of the attacker’s 454 
CPV will be eliminated, making the CPV only depends on g  . Similar, since the 455 
strategy of the defender will be countered by the attacker, the network will fall in case 456 
13 with no doubt. Thus, the CPV of the defender will only depend on l . 457 
We continue our analysis by examining the impact of the sensitivity to loss than 458 




Figure 6 CPVs under the Alteration of   461 
Observation 4. If the players become more sensitive to losses than before, the 462 
CPV of the attacker will remain the same. However, the CPV of the defender will 463 
greatly decrease, thus lower down the summation of CPVs. 464 
Recall that the CPV of the attacker under this case does not depend on l  and  , 465 
making the reason behind is similar as the explanation of observation 2. Before ending 466 
this section, we summarize the impact of CPT model and how can the new model be 467 
applied in providing guidance to the attacker and the defender in interdependent 468 
network. Traditional reliability modelling techniques usually assume that all players are 469 
entirely reasonable and risk-neutral. However, in reality, some players are engaging risk 470 
and endeavoring to take radical strategy to destroy its enemy regardless of cost. On the 471 
contrary, some players are afraid of taking risk and will always choose the most 472 
conservative strategy to minimize the expected loss. The CPT model, benefits to the 473 
literature since it incorporates player’s risk attitude into concern. Taking the benchmark 474 
as an example. The Tullock model results in a static strategy set for both the attacker 475 
and the defender. However, the CPT model provides suggestions in a dynamic strategy 476 
set where more risky strategy, i.e., giving up some nodes, or more conservative strategy, 477 
i.e., evenly protection, can be employed based on different risk parameter combinations. 478 
Both the attacker and the defender, can always try to deduce the risk sensitivity for the 479 
other side, and make their decision more wisely and targeted. 480 
 481 
6. Discussion 482 
The preceding sections investigate the situation for a network that is composed of 483 
a small number of nodes. For complex networks composed of a large number of nodes, 484 
one can use simulation to estimate its reliability. In the literature, there are several 485 
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methods have been proposed.  486 
 Wandelt et al. (2018) proposed a new framework, referred to as quick robustness 487 
estimation, for assessing the robustness of a network in sub-quadratic time. Its 488 
computational speed is significantly faster than betweenness centrality.  489 
 One can consider the reorganization of data structure. For example, Benson et 490 
al. (2016) proposed a method to solve the large-scale complex networks through 491 
clustering the network on the basis of higher-order connectivity patterns. A 492 
series of meta-heuristic algorithms can also benefit the computational speed 493 
(Šenkeřík et al. 2018).  494 
To calculate the robustness of a complex system, one cannot theoretically derive 495 
the dominating strategies for all players (see the game theoretical approach in Li et al. 496 
(2019)). But it is possible to numerically investigate the optimal strategy based on the 497 
design of algorithms and simulation. Additionally, quantum computer and quantum 498 
computation are gaining extreme popularity these years. The construction of quantum 499 
system accelerates the computational efficiency and benefits all fields, i.e., machine 500 
learning and large-scale calculation. With the introduction of quantum computer, even 501 
for complex systems with amounts of node, BDD can produce accurate results in an 502 
acceptable time duration. 503 
 504 
7. Conclusions and Future Works 505 
This paper analyzes the attack-defense game of a network consisting of 506 
interdependent subnetworks. The defender moves first and allocates its limited resource 507 
to the nodes and the attacker then moves. Both players choose their strategies to 508 
maximize their own cumulative prospect values. The binary decision diagram is used 509 
to obtain the potential outcomes of the given network. Since the cumulative prospect 510 
theory is used, the risk preferences of both players can be depicted and the alterations 511 
of the optimal strategy combination are illustrated to find the influence under different 512 
cases. 513 
Our future work will consider a possible extension of the case where both players 514 
in the attack-defense game own unlimited resource. Then they should only optimize the 515 
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allocation and some close-formed solution may be obtained. Besides, our future 516 
research will incorporate the use of false targets of the defender to increase the 517 
survivability of each node in the networks. Additionally, as we mentioned in Section 4, 518 
our future work will also incorporate two different scenarios: the attacker moves first, 519 
and both players move simultaneously, and compare the result with our proposed model. 520 
Finally, one can consider the calculation efficiency optimization. Simulation methods, 521 
heuristic algorithms, and data reorganization are all potentially useful in employing 522 
BDD to solve a large-scale complex system. 523 
 524 
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